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Abstract  
Mathematical models play an increasingly important role in our understanding of the 
transmission and control of infectious diseases. Here, we present concrete examples 
illustrating how mathematical models paired with rigorous statistical methods are used to 
parse data of different levels of detail and breadth and estimate key epidemiological 
parameters (e.g. transmission and its determinants, severity, impact of interventions, drivers 
of epidemic dynamics) even when these parameters are not directly measurable, when data 
are limited and the epidemic process is only partially observed. Finally, we assess the hurdles 
to be taken to increase availability and applicability of these approaches in an effort to 
ultimately enhance their public health impact.   
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 Main text  
 
The multiple contributions of modelling to the study of infectious disease 
Over the last 30 years, mathematical modeling has become an essential tool for the study of 
infectious diseases epidemics [1]. Such approach is complementary to traditional methods in 
that, contrary to classical epidemiological methods common to both communicable and non-
communicable diseases, modelling explicitly accounts for the interactions between 
individuals in an effort to explain the complex transmission dynamics inherent to the spread 
of infectious diseases in populations. Mathematical models are now commonly used to 
address a variety of questions that can inform policy making, e.g. the optimal allocation of 
intervention measures [2,3], the planning and evaluation of vaccination programs [4,5], 
nowcasting and forecasting [6,7], the design and evaluation of vaccine efficacy in clinical trials 
[8–10], or real-time risk assessment during epidemics [11,12]. A number of reviews have 
already covered different aspects of this quickly expanding field. For example, Grassly and 
Fraser explained basic principles [13] while Heesterbeek et al [14] and Metcalf and Lessler 
[15] discussed their use and impact on policy making in the context of the complex landscape 
of global health and major emerging infectious diseases outbreaks. 
 
Here, we will focus on yet another contribution of modelling and show how the use of these 
techniques can considerably strengthen the analyses of epidemiological data collected during 
epidemic. We will take the perspective of an epidemiologist who collected data during an 
epidemic and is now at the difficult stage of trying to estimate key epidemiological parameters 
(e.g. transmissibility, severity, proportion of asymptomatic infections, impact of interventions, 
drivers of spread and control) from these data, in a context where data collection may be 
affected by selection bias (e.g. severe cases are more likely to be detected), under-reporting 
or missing data issues (e.g. the source of infection of a case is unknown) and where the 
 parameters of interest may therefore not be directly measurable. We will highlight with 
concrete examples how modelling techniques have proved instrumental in tackling 
challenges associated with the analysis of such imperfect data, estimating key 
epidemiological parameters, and gaining essential insight into the underlying epidemic 
process.   
 
Estimating transmissibility and transmission risk factors 
The reproduction number 𝑅 (see Glossary) (also called the effective reproduction number) 
characterizes the level of transmission at a given time during an epidemic and is defined as 
the mean number of secondary infections caused by a case at that time. The epidemic can 
affect a substantial proportion of the population only if 𝑅 > 1[1]. 
 
The most natural way to estimate reproduction numbers is to rely on data documenting chains 
of transmission (Fig. 1A). For example, during the large epidemic of Ebola in West Africa, 
major efforts were implemented to identify and reconstruct these chains. Fay et al analyzed 
such data for Conakry, the capital city of Guinea, during the first part of the epidemic 
(February to August 2014) [16]. When the information about who was infected by whom is 
available, estimating reproduction numbers is straightforward and just a matter of counting 
secondary infections for each individual case. From these data, Faye et al estimated that, at 
the start of the epidemic, an Ebola case infected on average 1.4, 0.4 and 0.5 contacts in the 
community, the hospital, and funerals settings, respectively, and that there was an important 
reduction of transmission in hospitals and funerals once controls were in place. They also 
demonstrated that hospitalization of cases halved their transmission potential in the 
community, highlighting the critical role of prompt case isolation to reduce community 
transmission; and that healthcare workers, who were at high risk of infection, contributed little 
to transmission.  
  
While data on chains of transmission are highly valuable, they are difficult or impossible to 
collect for many pathogens and thus extremely rare. Modelers have therefore developed 
alternative approaches to characterize transmission from more partial and incomplete data. 
For example, upon the emergence of the highly pathogenic avian influenza strain H5N1, the 
prospect of a major severe influenza pandemic was raised if the virus were to increase its 
potential for inter-human transmission. In such situations where we are confronted with 
stuttering chains of transmission in humans, Ferguson et al argued that it would be possible 
to detect any such increase from the examination of the size of clusters of human cases (i.e. 
the number of human infections generated from a spillover from the reservoir) (Fig. 1B)[17]. 
This is because the average size 𝐶 of a cluster is expected to increase with the reproduction 
number 𝑅, with the simple relationship 𝐶 = 1/(1 − 𝑅). However, a potential difficulty in using 
cluster size to evaluate transmissibility is that selection biases (e.g. larger clusters are more 
likely to be detected) or underreporting (i.e. a proportion of cases are missed during 
investigations) may bias inference in different directions. Methods have therefore been 
proposed to correct for such effects [18]. It is also well acknowledged that case-to-case 
heterogeneity in infectivity that can cause superspreading events must be accounted for 
[19,20].  
 
These approaches may sometimes prove impractical if it is not possible to measure the size 
of human clusters. For example, in 2012, human cases of swine origin influenza A H3N2v 
infections were detected in the USA, in particular among people attending animal fairs [21]. 
The large volume of visitors at these fairs prevented the implementation of thorough 
epidemiological investigations required to identify all infected persons and determine cluster 
sizes. How then to interpret the observation that 50% of cases detected by viral surveillance 
had not been exposed to swines? Was that the sign of a starting pandemic? When we 
 observe a set of independent cases for whom the likely source of infection (human vs 
reservoir) has been identified, the reproduction number 𝑅 can be estimated from the 
proportion 𝐹 of cases linked to the reservoir, with the simple formula: 𝑅 = 1 − 𝐹 = 0.5 [21]. 
While the transmission potential of the H3N2v strain was higher than that of other swine 
strains, it was therefore still substantially smaller than what is required to generate a pandemic 
(i.e. 𝑅<1). Estimation methods based on the size of human clusters or the proportion of cases 
linked to the reservoir are most relevant for situations where stuttering chains of transmission 
are observed (i.e. there is not yet strong evidence for high interhuman transmission potential) 
since a point estimate for 𝑅 is available with these methods only when 𝑅<1. These methods 
can be used to test the hypothesis that 𝑅>1; but if the hypothesis cannot be rejected, other 
approaches and types of data will be required to derive a point estimate of 𝑅.   
 
Data collected during detailed outbreak investigations can provide critical insights into 
transmission patterns. For example, if two members of the same household become sick with 
the delay between symptom onsets roughly equal to the serial interval of the disease, this 
may suggest that the first case infected the second. However, other sources of infection (e.g. 
from outside the household or from other household members) cannot be excluded. Statistical 
methods have been developed to probabilistically reconstruct chains of transmission and infer 
transmission risk factors from data gathered during outbreak investigations where all 
members of a social structure (e.g. household, school, village) are investigated and times of 
symptom onset are recorded. These methods were used extensively to characterize the 
transmission of influenza in households from a powerful study design where household 
contacts of confirmed influenza cases are followed-up for a few weeks after symptom onset 
of the first case. These analyses provided key insights about the determinants of influenza 
transmission such as estimates of the risk of household transmission and how this varies with 
 household size, the infectivity and susceptibility of children relative to adults, the serial interval 
of influenza (which is important to determine for how long cases should be isolated, to assess 
the impact of treatment delays on transmission or estimate other parameters such as the 
reproduction number), the relationship between viral shedding and infectivity, and the 
protective effect of baseline antibody titers [2,22–28]. These methods have also been used 
to investigate transmission in more complex social settings such as a school [29] or a small 
village [30]. In the latter example, Salje et al were able to estimate that chikungunya 
transmission occurred on average at about 100 m from the household location, based on a 
detailed investigation of a chikungunya outbreak in a village in Bangladesh where each 
household was geotagged [30].  
 
Epidemic time series, which are often available through routine surveillance, can also be used 
to decipher fundamental aspects of spread and estimate parameters such as the reproduction 
number. The number of cases at the start of an epidemic usually grows exponentially, which 
means that the number of cases at time 𝑡 can be modelled as 𝐼(𝑡) = 𝐼0𝑒௥௧ , where 𝐼0 is the 
number of cases at time 0 and 𝑟 is the exponential growth rate. During exponential growth, 
the logarithm of the number of cases grows linearly (𝑙𝑛(𝐼(𝑡)) = 𝑙𝑛(𝐼0) + 𝑟𝑡) so that the 
exponential growth rate parameter 𝑟 can be estimated with a simple linear regression of the 
log-incidence. The reproduction number 𝑅 can then be derived from the exponential growth 
rate estimate and the distribution of the generation time of the disease (Fig. 1C) [31]. For a 
simple model like the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model (see Box 1), the 
reproduction number can be estimated as 𝑅 = 1 + 𝑟. 𝐺𝑇, where 𝐺𝑇 is the mean generation 
time. Mills et al used such approach to estimate the reproduction number of the 1918 
influenza pandemic from the analysis of weekly mortality records in 45 US cities and inform 
efforts to prepare for a severe influenza pandemic [32].  
  
It is important to note that a number of extrinsic factors such as interventions, climate, 
entomological or social factors may impact the reproduction number over time. Methods have 
therefore been developed to track trends in the reproduction number during the course of an 
epidemic, again from the analysis of the epidemic curve and prior knowledge about the 
generation time (Fig. 1D) [33]. These approaches for example showed that, during the SARS 
epidemic in Hong Kong in 2001, the reproduction number dropped from 3.6 to 0.7 following 
the implementation of control measures [33]. Extensions have since been proposed to ensure 
estimates can be provided in near real-time, even when some of the secondary infections 
have not been detected yet [34–36].  
 
Similarly, changes in the reproduction number over time can indicate whether a disease 
system is nearing elimination, such as in response to mass drug administration campaigns 
against parasitic worm diseases, including schistosomiasis, onchocerciasis, and lymphatic 
filariasis. Assessing whether a disease system has reached its breakpoint, i.e., a state below 
which parasite densities are too low for the population to sustain, is critically important to 
determine whether it is warranted to end a campaign. Typically, such questions are 
addressed by fitting complex transmission models to epidemiological data (e.g. annual 
microfilaria prevalence levels) and examining whether the system, under the fitted 
parameters, indeed approaches elimination and with what level of certainty [37,38]. Recent 
efforts have focussed on more general, ‘model-free’ approaches that are based on the idea 
that parasite populations below the breakpoint exhibit dynamics that can be distinguished in 
epidemiological data of parasite burden or prevalence [39]. Specifically, the authors 
demonstrate a direct relationship between the reproduction number (for macroparasites the 
mean number of parasites produced by a single reproductive parasite) and the rate of change 
of the empirically measured mean worm burden, as captured by the elimination feasibility 
 coefficient. Such efforts critically rely on measurements of infection intensity both prior to and 
during campaigns, as well as reliable data on treatment coverage.    
 
Unravelling drivers of epidemic dynamics 
When the disease starts to affect a substantial proportion of a population, evaluating the 
impact of extrinsic factors on transmission is complicated by the fact that the reproduction 
number 𝑅(𝑡) at time 𝑡 also depends on the level of immunity in the population at that time: 
𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑅0(𝑡). 𝑆(𝑡) where 𝑅0(𝑡) is the basic reproduction number (i.e. the expected number of 
secondary infections caused by a case if the whole population was susceptible, under 
conditions equal to those observed at time 𝑡)  and 𝑆(𝑡) is the proportion of susceptible 
individuals in the population. As immunity builds up in the population, the effective 
reproduction number is therefore expected to decline, even if there is no change in conditions 
(e.g., climatic conditions, control efforts, behavior change). To ensure estimates of the impact 
of extrinsic factors are not biased, it is therefore important to correctly account for the 
depletion of susceptible individuals in the population. To this end a suite of compartmental, 
SIR-type models, were developed to track the build-up of immunity along with other key 
quantities such as the number of infections (see Box 1).  
 
These models have proved extremely useful to understand the complex interplay between 
transmission factors and immunity in the shaping of epidemics. Consider measles, which 
caused important cyclical outbreaks in industrialized countries before vaccine introduction. 
Fitting such models to biweekly measles notifications from England and Wales during 1944-
1964, Finkenstaedt and Grenfell demonstrated that fluctuations of the susceptible population 
(driven by infections and births) and seasonal variations in the transmission rate (driven by 
school holidays) were necessary to explain the observed cyclical patterns of outbreaks during 
that time period [40]. Moreover, the study showed that the shift from annual to biannual cycles 
 after 1950 was explained by a reduction in birth rates, resulting in a slower replenishment of 
the susceptible population, and that only about 50% of measles cases were reported.  
 
The framework also helped to decipher the drivers of epidemic seasonality or the impact of 
interventions. For example, from US influenza-related mortality data, Shaman et al 
demonstrated that the transmission of influenza was strongly modulated by absolute humidity 
[41] while Perkins et al analyzed chikungunya surveillance data from 50 countries to describe 
how chikungunya transmission was impacted by temperature and precipitation [42]. During 
the 1918 pandemic influenza, Bootsma et al observed stark heterogeneity in the presence 
and size of a second wave (the autumn wave) across US cities; more than seen in European 
cities, where only one city experienced a second wave [43]. The authors posited the 
hypothesis that autumn waves resulted from imperfect, short-lived efforts that controlled 
transmission during the first wave, yet, when lifted, facilitated a second wave due to a 
susceptible population larger than would be expected in the absence of control. To test this 
hypothesis and estimate the impact of social distancing (e.g., school closures, banning of 
mass gatherings, case isolation, and hygiene measures), the authors fitted SEIR-type 
models (see Box 1) to observed time series of pneumonic and influenza mortality. They found 
that i) including both a time-limited effect of social distancing (as informed by onset and end 
dates of control) and changes in contact rates in response to increasing mortality best 
explained the observed time series, and that ii) the impact of control efforts was limited 
(reduction in mortality 10-30%) yet could have been improved if they were implemented 
earlier and left in place for longer.  
 
Models have also been used to parse epidemiological data and assess the presence, 
strength, and duration of cross-immunity (i.e., where infection by one strain or serotype results 
in immunity against others) and other complex mechanisms of immunity. SIR-type models 
 (see Box 1) can be expanded to account for the circulation of multiple strains with cross-
immunity and waning of immunity, among others. By comparing the fit of models with and 
without cross-immunity to enterovirus surveillance data in Japan, Takahashi et al. 
demonstrated that following infection by enterovirus serotype A16, individuals are immune to 
infection by closely related enterovirus serotype A71 for two months [44]. Similarly, Reich et 
al. estimated that individuals infected by one of the four dengue serotypes remained immune 
to the other serotypes for 1-3 years, based on 30 years of serotyped monthly dengue 
notification data from Thailand [45][46,47].  
 
Reconstructing transmission history from serological data 
While time-series of cases have proven helpful to disentangle a multitude of epidemiological 
processes, for infectious diseases with limited surveillance capacities and a high risk of 
misdiagnosis, alternative data types and associated methods are needed to answer questions 
about the history of pathogen circulation. In such situation, age-stratified serological surveys, 
which assess immunological markers of previous infections, can be used to reconstruct the 
history of circulation of a pathogen in the population. Consider a disease system where 
infection causes life-long immunity. In a scenario where a single epidemic of the pathogen 
occurred fifteen years ago (i.e. in 2003) and infected 30% of the population, we would expect 
that 30% of those aged 15 years or older in 2018 are seropositive while none of those aged 
<15 year should be (Fig. 2A,B, red line). In contrast, if there was constant low-level circulation 
of the pathogen, we would expect seroprevalence to increase gradually with age (Fig. 2A,B, 
blue line). The age-stratified seroprevalence therefore contains a strong signature of the long-
term history of pathogen circulation. Serocatalytic models have been developed to formally 
reconstruct year-to-year variations in the force of infection from such data [48]. Based on 
two age-stratified serological studies, Salje et al. used these approaches to show that over 
the last sixty years four distinct chikungunya outbreaks occurred in the Philippines, each 
 affecting about a quarter of the population [49]. Similarly, combining age-stratified data from 
over a hundred serosurveys, Cucunaba et al. used catalytic models to quantify the impact of 
the Chagas disease control and elimination program in Colombia during the last three 
decades [50]. The study showed that, while the force of infection dropped by up to 90% in 
urban settings, it remained constant in remote areas, highlighting major geographic variations 
in program impact. 
 
The classical catalytic models can be modified to relax the hypothesis of lifelong immunity. 
Reversible catalytic models were particularly used for malaria, where each individual is born 
susceptible, can become seropositive upon malaria exposure but later revert to the 
susceptible state. Seroreversion leads to a plateau in the age-profile of seroprevalence that 
accounts for the switching of individuals between immune and susceptible states (Fig. 2C). 
Using these methods, Drakeley et al investigated the prevalence of IgG antibodies of 
Plasmodium falciparum antigens in several locations of Tanzania, and estimated a half-life of 
fifty years for MSP-119 antibody as well as the rates of seroconversion [51]. Reversible 
catalytic models were used in other settings, for instance in Northern Ghana [52], where the 
authors established the wide heterogeneity in seroconversion and seroreversion rates 
between the antibodies to antigens specific to various stages of the parasite life cycle. 
 
Quantifying asymptomatic infections and disease severity 
The clinical presentation for many diseases can vary from fully asymptomatic to severe 
symptoms requiring hospitalization and death. Quantifying the proportion of subclinical 
infections or measures of severity such as the case fatality ratio (CFR) is crucial to 
understanding epidemic dynamics and disease burden. This is however a challenging task. 
For example, in 2009, when swine-origin influenza pandemic H1N1pdm09 started in Mexico, 
the first estimates of the CFR obtained from Mexican surveillance data by dividing the number 
 of reported deaths by the number of reported cases overestimated the CFR by two orders of 
magnitude. This is because while deaths (i.e. the numerator of the CFR) were relatively well 
reported, only very severe cases were picked up by surveillance and so the total number of 
infections (i.e. the denominator of the CFR) was completely underestimated. To estimate this 
denominator, Fraser et al decided that, instead of using data from Mexican surveillance that 
was getting saturated and missed a lot of mild cases, they would rely on surveillance 
implemented by developed countries around the world to detect sick travelers returning from 
Mexico as it was likely to have better sensitivity [12]. From the number of influenza cases 
detected among returning travelers and air passenger data documenting the total number of 
travelers returning from Mexico and the average duration of stay in Mexico, they were able to 
back-calculate the size of the Mexican epidemic and derive the CFR. This was done under 
the assumption that visitors mixed perfectly with the Mexican population. Their estimate of 
the CFR was lower than the one obtained from the Mexican surveillance; but it still 
overestimated the CFR, possibly because travelers were actually less likely to be exposed to 
influenza than Mexican inhabitants due to inhomogeneous mixing.  
 
In contrast, to estimate the total number of MERS-CoV infections in Saudi Arabia, Lessler et 
al relied on a detailed comparison of cases detected by passive (e.g. cases identified because 
they seek care with MERS-like symptoms) and active surveillance (e.g. investigation of the 
contacts of confirmed cases) [53]. The two surveillance systems each present their own 
strengths and weaknesses: passive surveillance is expected to detect most severe cases but 
will overestimate severity; while active surveillance is far from exhaustive but should provide 
more accurate estimates of the proportion of infections that become symptomatic. By 
combining data from the two systems, Lessler et al. were able to derive from the number of 
severe cases (passive surveillance data) and the severity profile of cases (active surveillance 
data) the total number of MERS-CoV infections. They estimated that about half of MERS-
 CoV infections had been missed by surveillance in 2012-2014 with the probability of 
developing symptoms ranging from 11% in persons under 10 years old to 88% in those aged 
>70 years old.   
 
For a pathogen with low severity like the H1N1pdm09 pandemic influenza strain, it may prove 
difficult to estimate the CFR from a single cohort of infected individuals as this would require 
very large numbers of participants [54]. Instead, Presanis et al. derived “pyramidal” estimates 
of severity [55]. To estimate the symptomatic CFR, i.e. the proportion of symptomatic cases 
who died, they considered the conditional probabilities of the different steps a symptomatic 
case has to go through before dying: the probability of medical attendance among 
symptomatic cases, the probability of hospitalization among medically attended, and the 
probability of death after hospitalization (Fig. 3). Each probability was estimated using 
different datasets: a CDC survey on health-seeking behaviors following influenza-like 
illnesses, a study among medically attended infection in Milwaukee, another study among 
hospitalized cases in New York. The symptomatic case fatality ratio was estimated at 0.048%.  
 
Finally, even when asymptomatic or inapparent infections are not observed at all, the impact 
they have on the epidemic dynamics may be observed on apparently unrelated statistics, 
providing a pathway to characterize them. For example, Fraser et al used reporting of 
symptoms during the 1918 influenza outbreak in a large sample of households in Baltimore 
to estimate the proportion of asymptomatic infections [56]. The main idea behind their 
approach is that if a large proportion of household members report symptoms, this indicates 
that the proportion of asymptomatic infections cannot be very high. The authors used a chain-
binomial model [57], which describes the expected distribution of households according to 
their size and the number of infected members given two parameters: the probability of 
contracting the infection from the community (i.e. outside of the household) and the probability 
 of transmission from an infected member of the household to a susceptible one. This classical 
model was expanded to include a probability of asymptomatic infection, and thus to describe 
the expected distribution of households according to their size and the number of members 
reporting symptoms. The authors concluded that during the 1918 influenza pandemic, the 
probability of asymptomatic infection was very low (<6%).  
 
Concluding remarks 
In conclusion, modelling has become an important tool to enhance the analysis of imperfect 
epidemic data and estimate key epidemiological parameters even when they are not directly 
measurable or when data are limited and imperfect. There are however important hurdles to 
overcome before the methods discussed here can be used by all (see “Outstanding 
questions”). First, a lot of infectious disease epidemiologists may simply be unaware of these 
developments and it is important to better communicate these approaches to this audience 
for example in reviews such as this one and with concrete examples. Interested 
epidemiologists are encouraged to receive training in epidemic modelling, for example by 
attending one of the few dedicated short courses. While short course participants are unlikely 
to become expert modelers after one or two weeks training, these courses can prove 
extremely helpful to build a deeper understanding of the field and what can and cannot be 
achieved with modelling [58]. Another important challenge to make these approaches 
available to all is the persisting lack of user-friendly software designed for non-experts [34] 
although important efforts are being made to address this gap (see for example the RECON 
initiative1 or increasingly common code-sharing efforts [59]). While a lot of simple tasks can 
be automated in generic and user-friendly tools, the analysis of more complex datasets with 
relatively atypical structures is likely to benefit from the investment of expert modelers, which 
                                               
1 https://www.repidemicsconsortium.org/ 
 can best be achieved through collaboration. These collaborations are particularly important 
during epidemic crises where it is essential to develop an efficient flow to quickly collect, 
process, and analyze data and report results back to the public health community [11]. Finally, 
while we focused this paper on the analyses of epidemiological data gathered during 
infectious disease epidemics, major developments are ongoing to better integrate other types 
of data (e.g. social media [60], viral genetic sequences [61,62], contact and behavioral data 
[63,64]) into these analyses as well. 
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 Box 1: Compartmental models - the Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (SIR) model  
 
Compartmental models are some of the most established models in the field of infectious disease epidemiology. 
In one of the simplest versions, the Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (SIR) model, the population is divided up 
into susceptible (𝑆), infectious (𝐼), and recovered (𝑅; i.e. immune) individuals, and can transit between these 
compartments over time. A susceptible individual becomes infected at a rate 𝛽 𝐼/𝑁 and remains infectious for a 
duration 1/𝛾 before recovering and acquiring immunity. At the beginning of an epidemic, the number of 
infectious individuals increases exponentially. As susceptible individuals start to deplete and infectious 
individuals recover, transmission diminishes and the outbreak reaches its peak before dying out completely (A). 
This model is valid for the time scale of a typical epidemic, yet does not capture replenishment of susceptible 
populations through, for example, birth and migration processes. This is an important underlying driver of 
recurrence of epidemics and may, in particular in childhood diseases, result in periodic outbreaks (B), although 
at an even longer time scale the model may result in a positive steady state of the number of infected. While the 
simplest versions of the SIR-model assume the transmission parameter 𝛽 to be constant over the course of an 
epidemic, periodic changes thereof could be another explanation for observed periodicity in infection dynamics. 
In (C) we show the impact of a seasonally forced 𝛽 (for instance as a result of climatic variations) on transmission 
dynamics. Interventions, for instance aimed at reducing contact rates between people (i.e. social isolation) could 
further reduce the transmission parameter and halt  
epidemics from following its natural course. Depending 
on the characteristics of the pathogen and its 
transmission, other compartments can be added to the 
model, such as an “Exposed” compartment (SEIR 
model) to account for an incubation period that 
determines the time individuals are infected but not yet 
infectious. Further, departures from simplifying 
assumptions such as heterogeneous mixing (i.e., each 
individual has an equal probability of being in contact 
with any other individual in a population) can be 
implemented depending on the context and transmission 
system.  
Statistical methods to estimate the parameters of these 
models have greatly improved in the last 20 years. While 
earlier approaches such as the time-series SIR (TSIR) 
model imposed some relatively strong constraints about 
the structure of the data and the underlying transmission 
model (e.g. the time step of the data had to be equal to 
the generation time of the pathogen) [40], these 
constraints were relaxed in subsequent developments, 
allowing more flexibility and model complexity [65–
67].     
 
 Figure I: Schematics of compartmental models       
and population dynamics 
 
 
  
 Glossary 
Case fatality ratio: Proportion of death among infected individuals. 
Force of infection: Per capita rate of infection in susceptible individuals. 
Generation time: Time delay between infection in a case and in the people they infect. 
Reproduction number: Mean number of persons infected by a case. 
Serial interval: Time delay between symptom onset in a case and in the persons they infect. 
Sero-catalytic models: A class of model used to estimate the annual rate of seroconversion 
from the age-profile of seroprevalence. 
Transmission tree: A description of the individual events of transmission between infected 
cases. 
  
 Highlights  
• Numerous data types can be used to estimate the transmission potential of a 
pathogen including descriptions of the chains of transmission, human cluster sizes, sources 
of infection of a subset of cases, epidemic curves. 
• An important agenda in public health is understanding the impact of control methods. 
However, the dynamic nature of epidemics makes this task challenging since for example a 
reduction in case counts following the implementation of an intervention could simply be due 
to the depletion of susceptible individuals in the population. Models can disentangle the 
natural course of outbreaks from the effect of external factors.  
• In the absence of reliable surveillance data, models can reconstruct epidemic history 
by combining age-specific seroprevalence data with understanding of the natural history of 
infection.   
• Mechanisms of immunity are hard to observe on an individual level, yet affect 
population-level dynamics. Models can tease out such signatures.  
• When a lot of infections are unobserved and the most severe ones are more likely to 
be detected by surveillance, morbidity and mortality can be difficult to estimate. In these 
situations, models can be used to jointly analyze different surveillance sources, with a view 
to better account for unobserved infections and obtain more reliable estimates of morbidity 
and mortality. 
  
 Outstanding questions  
● How can we reduce the gap between methods development and implementation in the 
field, to make tools more accessible for the wider public health community?  
● How can we minimize delays between data collection, analysis, and communication of 
findings to inform outbreak responses in time? 
● How can we integrate data from different sources (social media data, viral genetic 
sequences) to take advantage of their complementarity? 
 
 
 
  
  
 
Figure 1. Approaches to estimate the reproduction number. When chains of transmission 
are available, the reproduction number is obtained by counting directly the number of 
secondary infections (A). The reproduction number can also be estimated from the 
distribution of the sizes of clusters of human cases (B). Epidemic time series are also 
informative. At the start of an epidemic, the number of cases grows exponentially and the 
growth rate r can be used to estimate of the reproduction number (C). During the course of 
an epidemic, variations of the reproduction number can also be estimated (D).  
  
  
 
Figure 2. Estimating historical patterns of infection from age-stratified serological 
surveys.  The panels show how the history of circulation of a pathogen (A) is expected 
to impact age-stratified seroprevalence when immunity is life-long (B) or temporary (C). 
In the red scenario, an epidemic infecting 30% of the population occurred 15 years ago. If 
immunity is life-long, the seroprevalence is expected to be 30% among those aged ≥15 
years old but null among younger individuals (B). In the blue scenario, low-level 
continuous circulation of the pathogen (A) is expected to lead to a slow increase of 
seroprevalence with age (B). In the case of waning immunity, a plateau in seroprevalence 
 for older individuals may be expected (C). Catalytic models were developed to reconstruct 
the history of circulation of the pathogen from serological surveys. The force of infection 
is the annual probability a susceptible individual gets infected.  
  
  
Figure 3. Pyramide of severity.  The proportion of symptomatic individuals that die can be 
estimated from the conditional probabilities of the different steps a symptomatic case has to 
go through before dying (e.g. probability of symptomatic being medical attended, medical 
attendance to hospitalization, hospitalization to death) that can be derived from different data 
sources [55]. 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
